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NOTE 
MENS REA IN ALASKA: FROM 
BAD THOUGHTS TO NO 
THOUGHTS? 
LEE PERLA* 
This Note examines how the most recent Alaska Supreme Court 
decision affirming the criminal conviction of the captain of the 
Exxon Valdez oil tanker for negligent discharge of oil under the 
civil standard of negligence departed from Alaska’s prior mens 
rea jurisprudence.  Alaska had operated under a Model Penal 
Code-based mens rea regime that required a somewhat heightened 
showing of mens rea.  Although the decision has not been widely 
applied, it has the potential to dramatically alter the scope of pro-
tections afforded criminal defendants in Alaska. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: UNDERWAY WITH STATE V. HAZELWOOD 
A. Civil Responsibility and Criminal Accountability 
In the American legal system, we hold each other responsible 
for wrongdoing with either civil remedies or criminal punishment.  
The former involves paying money for harms caused.  The latter 
involves far more serious consequences—the loss of life or liberty.  
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Counsel in the criminal system, unlike in a civil suit, are rarely 
equally matched.  The prosecutor usually commands greater re-
sources than the defendant on trial.  Despite our best efforts, that 
advantage sometimes places a criminal defendant in the untenable 
position of defending against the vast resources of government 
prosecutors from a position of weakness. 
To help alleviate those inequities, we adhere to a structural 
framework that safeguards the rights of individuals.  This frame-
work is rigorous enough to ensure that every criminal defendant is 
afforded a fair trial, one in which the defendant is presumed inno-
cent until proven guilty.  That framework is built on statute and 
practice.  Legislators have incorporated due process provisions in 
our state constitutions, in the rules of evidence and procedure, and 
in the criminal code itself.  Yet we do not depend on the foresight 
of legislators alone.  As the ultimate bulwark for fairness in the 
criminal justice system, our courts are empowered to intercede in 
ways both equitable and appropriate. 
Courts frequently act towards that aim by reading a mens rea 
element into criminal codes.  A criminal defendant must not only 
commit a bad act before punishment can be administered; the de-
fendant must do so as the result of “bad thoughts.”  In other words, 
in most cases, the defendant must possess a “culpable” mental state 
to be blameworthy of the alleged crime.1  Alaska’s Revised Crimi-
nal Code establishes the default state of mind for criminal punish-
ment to attach as either “knowingly” or “recklessly.”2  In fact, 
when the Code was first enacted, only three crimes used a lower 
“criminal negligence” standard.3  Crimes of “inadvertence” come 
before Alaska’s courts through various other regulatory statutes 
not contained in Title 11 of the Criminal Code. 
The Code distinguishes criminal from civil negligence by re-
quiring a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reason-
able person would have observed under like circumstances for 
criminal negligence, whereas civil negligence merely requires any 
 
 1. See Barry Jeffrey Stern, Consciousness of Wrongdoing: Mens Rea in 
Alaska, 1 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1984). 
 2. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (2004).  The default mens rea required is 
“knowingly” for “conduct” offenses and “recklessly” for “circumstance or result” 
crimes.  Id.  The code also generally requires a “culpable mental state” for crimi-
nal liability.  § 11.81.600(b).  A culpable mental state is defined as intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence.  § 11.81.900(14). 
 3. See Stern, supra note 1, at 45 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.130(a) (1983) 
(criminally negligent homicide); § 11.46.430(a) (criminally negligent burning); § 
11.56.370(a) (permitting an escape through criminal negligence)). 
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deviation from a reasonable standard of care.4  Alaska’s Pattern 
Criminal Jury Instruction defines criminal negligence as “some-
thing more than the slight degree of negligence necessary to sup-
port a civil action for damages and is negligence of a degree so 
gross as to be deserving of punishment.”5  In practical terms, this 
distinction affords the criminal defendant the right to emphasize to 
the jury the seriousness of criminal punishment.6  It also serves the 
broad policy goal of reserving criminal sanctions for criminals, and 
civil punishments for accidental offenders.  Alaska’s courts have 
been recognized as being among the vanguard that support this 
axiom of fairness.  Indeed, criminal law casebooks use Alaska ex-
amples to illustrate the role mens rea plays in the criminal justice 
system.7  A recent decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, however, 
may signal a change.  In State v. Hazelwood,8 the court let stand a 
criminal conviction and jail sentence under the negligence standard 
previously applicable only to civil matters. 
B. Course Charted Herein 
This Note evaluates State v. Hazelwood, and explores whether 
the conviction of the captain of the Exxon Valdez for negligent dis-
charge of oil changed the criminal standard of negligence in 
Alaska.  Part II begins with a brief overview of the events giving 
rise to the criminal case against Captain Hazelwood.  Part III sug-
gests that Chief Justice Compton’s dissent correctly outlined the 
binding nature of the Rule of Lenity9 and determines that the Rule 
should have applied in this case.  Part IV discusses what Chief Jus-
 
 4. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (2004); see also Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 
1063, 1066 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“[C]ivil negligence [is precluded] from form-
ing the basis for a criminal conviction.”). 
 5. State v. Hazelwood (Hazelwood IV), 946 P.2d 875, 889 (Alaska 1997) 
(Compton, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Alaska Pattern Jury In-
struction (Criminal) 81.900(a)(4)). 
 6. See generally Stern, supra note 1, which extensively reviewed the evolution 
of Alaska’s mens rea requirement.  This Note contributes to that discussion by 
considering how the Hazelwood decision affects that jurisprudence. 
 7. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
237–239 (4th ed. 2000). 
 8. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997). 
 9. See State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (“Ambi-
guities in criminal statutes must be narrowly read and construed strictly against 
the government.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1358–59 (8th ed. 2004) (“A court, 
in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent 
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punish-
ment.”). 
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tice Compton called the majority’s “violence to precedent”; and 
Part V highlights the majority opinion’s troubling substitution of 
the due process protections afforded criminal defendants with 
those of civil litigants.  The Note argues that this substitution was 
unnecessary and unwarranted.  The facts of the case demonstrate 
Hazelwood’s guilt under the previous criminal standard of negli-
gence.  Thus, the Hazelwood court could and should have pre-
served the requirement for criminal intent that Alaska law had ear-
lier evidenced.  Part VI suggests that industry standards can 
provide a reliable means for the courts to determine when a ship’s 
captain merits criminal punishment. 
II.  BACKGROUND: EVENTS OF THE LOG 
A. Captain Hazelwood’s Voyage 
Just after midnight on March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil 
tanker, operated by the Exxon Shipping Company, ran aground on 
Bligh Reef, approximately one and a half miles outside the desig-
nated tanker lane.10  The vessel’s captain, Joseph J. Hazelwood, be-
gan the outbound trek on the bridge, and stayed there while a local 
pilot helped steer the vessel out of Valdez Harbor and through the 
narrows.11  But at the time of the grounding, Captain Hazelwood 
was in his cabin after having turned over the watch to Third Mate 
Gregory Cousins.12  Captain Hazelwood returned to the bridge 
when the navigation error became apparent, i.e., when the ship ran 
aground.13 
The grounding was not due to natural causes; seas were calm 
and visibility was good.14  Moreover, mechanical errors played no 
 
 10. Hazelwood v. State (Hazelwood III), 912 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1996); Craig Medred, NTSB Investigates Whether Ship Tried a Shortcut Course, 
Perilous Move May Explain Tanker’s Position, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 
1989, at A1. 
 11. See Medred, supra note 10, at A1. 
 12. Although Cousins’ licenses had been upgraded from third mate to second 
mate two months earlier, his title remained that of third mate because he was 
hired by Exxon to fill that role.  Cousins was qualified to run the ship at sea with a 
second mate’s license; however, he was not certified to pilot the ship through 
Prince William Sound.  Even so, it is generally accepted that someone with Cous-
ins’ skill and experience should have had sufficient expertise to guide the ship 
safely out of the Sound, although it would have been technically illegal.  Id. 
 13. See Hazelwood v. State (Hazelwood I), 836 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1992). 
 14. Medred, supra note 10, at A1. 
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part.15  Both the vessel and the navigation aids in the channel were 
in perfect working order, and the bridge team had at its disposal 
some of the most sophisticated commercial navigation equipment 
available.16  The channel was relatively easy to navigate, and the 
reef had been “charted and named” since 1794.17  Nevertheless, 
Valdez ran aground—and the consequences were catastrophic.  
Valdez eventually spilled eleven million gallons of oil into Prince 
William Sound, directly causing enormous economic and environ-
mental damage.18 
Though his outbound journey had ended, Captain Hazel-
wood’s legal trek had just begun with his now-infamous radio call.  
Captain Hazelwood reported the incident by radio to the Coast 
Guard Traffic Center in Valdez, approximately twenty minutes af-
ter the grounding (likely after the vessel’s inability to free herself 
became apparent).19  The federal and state investigations that fol-
lowed provided evidence of errors in seamanship.20  These findings 
 
 15. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 16. Apart from traditional navigational aids like charts, Valdez employed a 
LORAN (Long-Range Navigation System), a kind of Global Positioning System 
(“GPS”) that is augmented by shore-based emitters.  This gear should have been 
able to pinpoint the ship’s exact location.  Valdez also had two radars that could 
have been used to calculate the distance to the shoreline and all of the channel’s 
charted dangers in an instant.  See Medred, supra note 10, at A1. 
 17. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Bligh Island and Bligh Reef have been known to navigators for a long 
time.  Captain George Vancouver charted and named the island on his 
third voyage to the North Pacific on the Discovery [sic] in 1794.  The 
Bligh Island Reef has long been mapped on U.S. Coast and Geodetic 
Survey maps, shortened to Bligh Reef by the Coast and Geodetic Survey 
in 1930.  Captain William Bligh and Vancouver had been officers to-
gether sixteen years earlier, on the Resolution [sic], when Captain James 
Cook, among the greatest navigators in history, explored Alaska and the 
South Pacific.  Captain William Bligh is infamous from Fletcher Chris-
tian’s mutiny on the Bounty [sic].  The infamy was refreshed in 1989, the 
200th anniversary of the mutiny on the Bounty, by Captain Joseph 
Hazelwood of the Exxon Valdez [sic]. 
Id. (notations and citations omitted). 
 18. See id. at 1223–24. 
 19. Hazelwood v. State (Hazelwood I), 836 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1992). 
Ah, it’s Valdez back.  Ah, we’ve—ah, should be on your radar there—-
we’ve fetched up, ah, hard aground north of, ah, Goose Island off Bligh 
Reef.  And, ah, evidently, ah, leaking some oil, and, ah, we’re going to be 
here for awhile.  And, ah, if you want, ah, so you’re notified.  Over. 
Id. 
 20. See id. at 945.  But blame was not limited to the crew of Valdez.  Both the 
oil industry and state regulators received considerable criticism.  For a brief survey 
of some of the regulatory changes that went into effect in Alaska and other states 
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became the basis for Hazelwood’s subsequent indictment and 
prosecution for reckless endangerment, operating a watercraft 
while intoxicated, and negligent discharge of oil.21  The last charge 
is the focus of this Note, which argues that Hazelwood’s conviction 
changed Alaska’s requirement that the prosecutor show the defen-
dant possessed mens rea sufficiently culpable to be “deserving of 
[criminal] punishment.”22 
B. Captain Hazelwood’s Legal Trek 
At the outset, Captain Hazelwood moved to dismiss all of the 
charges against him.23  He argued that he was immune from prose-
cution because he had immediately reported the Exxon Valdez’s 
grounding and its discharge of oil to the Coast Guard in compli-
ance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.24  Hazelwood’s 
claim rested on a paragraph that conferred immunity on any per-
son who complies with the requirement to make an immediate re-
port.25  The trial court found both the independent source rule26 and 
 
along the West Coast, see James E. Beaver et al., Stormy Seas?  Analysis of New 
Oil Pollution Laws in the West Coast States, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 791 (1994). 
 21. Hazelwood I, 836 P.2d at 945. 
 22. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 889 (Alaska 1997) (Compton, C.J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 81.900(a)(4)). 
 23. Hazelwood I, 836 P.2d at 945. 
 24. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988). 
 25. Id.  In pertinent part, the statute provides: 
Any person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore 
facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of oil or a 
hazardous substance from such vessel or facility in violation of paragraph 
(3) of this subsection, immediately notify the appropriate agency of the 
United States Government of such discharge. . . .  Any such person (A) 
in charge of a vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is dis-
charged in violation of paragraph (3)(i) of this subsection, or (B) in 
charge of a vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged 
in violation of paragraph (3)(ii) of this subsection and who is otherwise 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of the dis-
charge, or (C) in charge of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, who 
fails to notify immediately such agency of such discharge shall, upon 
conviction, be fined in accordance with Title 18, or imprisoned for not 
more than 5 years, or both.  Notification received pursuant to this para-
graph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notification 
shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case, except a 
prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement. 
Id. § 1323(b)(5). 
 26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (8th ed. 2004) (“[E]vidence obtained by 
illegal means may nonetheless be admissible if that evidence is also obtained by 
legal means unrelated to the original illegal conduct.”). 
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the inevitable discovery doctrine27 applicable to Hazelwood’s case 
and denied Hazelwood’s motion to dismiss.28  A jury convicted 
Hazelwood of the negligent discharge of oil charge, a misde-
meanor.29  The trial judge sentenced Hazelwood to ninety days in 
jail and ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine.30  The trial court, how-
ever, suspended both the jail time and the fine,31 and conditioned 
the suspension on Hazelwood completing one year of probation, 
performing 1,000 hours of community work, and paying $50,000 in 
restitution.32 
Hazelwood appealed his conviction on the grounds that the 
trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for immunity, 
failed to suppress certain evidence of intoxication, and incorrectly 
instructed the jury regarding the applicable mens rea element re-
quired for a proper conviction.33  Hazelwood also appealed his sen-
tence.34  The Alaska Court of Appeals held that Hazelwood’s con-
viction was barred by immunity and that due process prohibited his 
prosecution based on evidence resulting from his report.35  When 
the Alaska Supreme Court reversed that decision,36 the court of 
 
 27. See Hazelwood I, 836 P.2d. at 950 (noting that a prosecutor may avoid 
suppression of illegally obtained evidence by demonstrating that the “same evi-
dence would inevitably have been discovered through lawful, untainted means had 
the illegality not occurred”). 
 28. Id. at 945. 
 29. Id. at 944 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.740 & § 46.03.790(a)(1)) (1988). 
 30. Id. 
 31. The trial judge later explained his reasoning to the press.  See Marilee 
Enge, Hazelwood Sentenced to Cleanup: Judge Gives Him 1,000 Hours on Oiled 
Beaches, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 1990, at A1 (“[t]he captain has al-
ready suffered ‘enormous shame’ and has undoubtedly been deterred from future 
crimes”). 
 32. Hazelwood I, 836 P.2d at 946. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 954.  The court reversed his conviction after considering only Hazel-
wood’s asserted immunity defense and not ruling on the merits of his other claims.  
Id. at 944. 
 36. State v. Hazelwood (Hazelwood II), 866 P.2d 827, 828 (Alaska 1993) (al-
lowing prosecution under the “inevitable discovery doctrine” even though urine 
evidence showing intoxication might not have been collected without Captain 
Hazelwood’s report).  But see Hazelwood III, 912 P.2d 1266, 1276 n.12 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1996). 
[B]ecause Hazelwood was aware that he was entitled to immunity from 
prosecution by virtue of his immediate report and thus had no reason to 
fear criminal prosecution, he stood to lose little by being fully coopera-
tive when he dealt with investigators who responded to his report.  Had 
the investigation been initiated independently of the immediate report, 
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appeals again overturned Hazelwood’s conviction, on the basis of 
the trial court’s failure to correctly instruct the jury.37  Over Hazel-
wood’s objection, the trial court had instructed the jury that the de-
fendant would be negligent if he “fail[ed] to perceive an unjustifi-
able risk that the result will occur; the risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe 
in the situation.”38  The trial court thus adopted the civil standard 
for negligence. 
The Alaska Supreme Court again reversed.39  It held that the 
civil standard for negligence could be used in Hazelwood’s criminal 
conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals for any 
unresolved issues.40  The court of appeals subsequently found that 
admission of Hazelwood’s statements concerning intoxication was 
harmless error and thus the sentence was reasonable.41  The second 
Alaska Supreme Court decision departs from Alaska’s prior mens 
rea jurisprudence, which shall now be examined. 
III.  RULE OF LENITY: A STARE DECISIS TO STEER HER BY 
A. Ambiguous Mens Rea Requirement in the Statute 
The criminal statute under which Captain Hazelwood was con-
victed for negligent discharge of oil did not specify the requisite 
level of mens rea required for conviction.42  It reads as follows: 
 
Hazelwood would have had no reason to consider himself immune from 
prosecution; consequently, he might not have been motivated to be as 
cooperative with investigators as he was when he believed himself im-
mune.  In particular, the record indicates that Hazelwood helped investi-
gators locate urine sampling kits, yet nothing in the record provides as-
surance that he would have assisted in the same manner had he not 
believed himself immune from prosecution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 37. Id. at 1279–80.  In no uncertain terms, the court found that “[c]ivil negli-
gence cannot be relied on to define ‘standard criminal offenses such as this’”; 
rather, “[t]o convict Hazelwood of a crime, the jury should have been required to 
find him criminally negligent.”  Id. at 1279. 
 38. Id. at 1278. 
 39. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 886 (Alaska 1997). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Hazelwood v. State (Hazelwood V), 962 P.2d 196, 197–98 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1998). 
 42. Captain Hazelwood was acquitted of criminal mischief, reckless endan-
germent, and operating a watercraft while intoxicated.  See Don Hunter, Hazel-
wood Cleared on Three Counts, Jury Finds Exxon Valdez Skipper Guilty Only of 
Misdemeanor Oil Discharge, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1990, at A1. 
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A person may not discharge, cause to be discharged, or permit 
the discharge of petroleum, acid, coal or oil tar, lampblack, ani-
line, asphalt, bitumen, or a residuary product of petroleum, into, 
or upon the waters or land of the state except in quantities, and 
at times and locations or under circumstances and conditions as 
the department may by regulation permit or where permitted 
under art. IV of the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended.43 
The notes for this section of the statute contained no guidance as to 
what level of mens rea might be appropriate for the prohibited con-
duct.44 
As Chief Justice Compton pointed out in his dissent, the ma-
jority in Hazelwood IV spent a considerable portion of its analysis 
contemplating the correct interpretation of the statute.45  The ma-
jority would not have done so were the mens rea required for con-
viction clear from the statute’s text.46  In the face of this ambiguity, 
the Rule of Lenity provided the only safe course for the Alaska 
Supreme Court to have navigated. 
B. The Rule of Lenity, Not Ambiguous at All 
Alaska courts have accepted the Rule of Lenity as a default 
rule of statutory construction for some time.  In State v. Andrews,47 
the supreme court found that “[a]mbiguities in criminal statutes 
must be narrowly read and construed strictly against the govern-
ment.”48  In his dissent in Hazelwood, Chief Justice Compton cited 
two earlier opinions that both require construing the mens rea 
 
 43. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.740 (1990).  The exceptions contained in art. IV of 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil al-
low for small discharges that may be necessary for the ship’s health, if in deep wa-
ter and at considerable distance from land.  Int’l Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, art. IV, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 2005 WL 
3759644. 
 44. Id.  The amended statute now explicitly states that “a person who with 
criminal negligence discharges oil in violation of AS 46.03.740” is guilty of either a 
class C or A felony depending on the volume released.  ALASKA STAT. § 
46.03.790(d) (2004) (emphasis added). 
 45. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 886 n.1 (Alaska 1997) (Compton, C.J., dis-
senting). 
 46. Id. 
 47. 723 P.2d 85, 86 (Alaska 1986). 
 48. Id. at 86–87 (affirming this statement from State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 
907 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)). 
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element in an otherwise ambiguous criminal statute as more than 
mere civil negligence.49 
More recently, in Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Cook Inlet Re-
gion,50 the Alaska Supreme Court held that “[s]tatutes are to be 
construed to avoid a substantial risk of unconstitutionality where 
adopting such a construction is reasonable.”51  Hazelwood was de-
fending against criminal charges and faced the possibility of jail 
time.  Incarceration for a criminal offense absent an adequate 
showing of mens rea raises serious due process concerns.52  Further, 
it would have been quite reasonable to construe the statute to re-
quire criminal negligence.  The court could have instructed the jury 
to render a guilty verdict only if Hazelwood possessed a mens rea 
greater “than the slight degree of negligence necessary to support a 
civil action” and “of a degree so gross as to be deserving of punish-
ment.”53  Thus, under the court’s prior jurisprudence, the Rule of 
Lenity was applicable. 
While not binding on the Alaska Supreme Court, it is helpful 
to examine the application of the Rule of Lenity under federal no-
tions of due process.  The United States Supreme Court recently 
incorporated a broad reading of the Rule into its interpretation of a 
criminal statute in favor of the criminal defendant.54  The Court 
considered the mens rea required by a Florida statute to determine 
if the conduct criminalized therein constituted a “crime of vio-
lence.”55  In considering the section of the statute proscribing the 
 
 49. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 886 (Compton, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wells v. 
State, 706 P.2d 711, 713 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the Rule of Lenity 
requires “ambiguities in penal statutes must be resolved in favor of the accused”); 
Manderson v. State, 655 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (deferring to the 
criminal defendant’s argued interpretation under the Rule of Lenity because both 
the state’s and the defendant’s positions were “arguably reasonable”)). 
 50. 807 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1991). 
 51. Id. at 498. 
 52. State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996). 
[I]t would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law to con-
vict a person of a serious crime without the requirement of criminal in-
tent. . . . [W]e adhere to the principles articulated in Speidel, Alex, Ki-
moktoak, and Guest that, except for public welfare type of offenses, strict 
criminal liability without some form of mens rea is violative of Alaska’s 
Constitution. 
Id. at 1245–46.  See also Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 890 n.5 (Compton, C.J., dis-
senting) (“all cases which carry the possibility of incarceration must include a 
mens rea requirement, unlike cases which do not”). 
 53. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 889 (Compton, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 54. See generally Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8–12 (2004). 
 55. Id. at 10–11. 
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use of physical force, the court read in “a higher degree of intent 
than negligent or merely accidental conduct,” based on the context 
in which the contested terms were used.56  The Court held that even 
if the statute’s language was ambiguous, it “would be constrained 
to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor” be-
cause of its potential application in criminal proceedings.57  Thus, 
the Court affirmed the Rule of Lenity’s role in statutory interpreta-
tion and required a higher level of mens rea when the statute might 
apply to criminal defendants.58 
In contrast, in a separate case, the Court declined to apply the 
Rule of Lenity when a straightforward reading of the statute re-
vealed no ambiguity.59  The Court held that because the statute’s 
“mens rea requirements narrow the sweep of the statute,” its inter-
pretation “is not a case of guesswork reaching out for lenity.”60  In 
other words, the statute was narrow enough as enacted; fairness 
demanded no application of the Rule of Lenity.  As these and re-
lated decisions rest on federal constitutional principles of the ap-
propriate protections for criminal defendants,61 Alaska courts must 
consider carefully the boundaries they define.62  For Hazelwood’s 
 
 56. Id. at 9. 
 57. Id. at 12 n.8. 
 58. Id. (citing United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 
517–18 (1992) (“[The statute] is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and 
noncriminal applications.  Because we must interpret the statute consistently, 
whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule 
of lenity applies.”)). 
 59. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (“The rule of lenity ap-
plies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived . . . we can 
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (declining to 
“radically change the weights and balances in the scales of justice” because “[t]he 
purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is 
to ease the prosecution’s path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit 
as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe 
the freedom heretofore allowed juries”). 
 62. Cf. 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4509 (Horack 3d ed. 
1943) (recognizing that the legislature and the courts both promise to support the 
state and federal constitutions and that it must be presumed that they intended to 
do so; anything contrary must necessarily have been by mistake); Dan M. Kahan, 
Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 350 (1994) (ar-
guing that the Rule of Lenity, for federal criminal law at least, furthers “legislative 
supremacy not just by preventing courts from covertly undermining legislative de-
cisions, but also by forcing Congress to shoulder the entire burden of criminal 
lawmaking even when it prefers to cede some part of that task to the courts”).  See 
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case, the Rule of Lenity directed an interpretation of the statute 
that avoided infringement of the constitutional protections af-
forded him as a criminal defendant; namely, that he not be con-
victed for his bad act unless the state could show he acted with 
some level of criminal intent. 
Prior to Hazelwood, criminal defendants in Alaska could not 
be convicted of serious offenses on the basis of simple negligence.63  
This allowed criminal defendants to put one important question to 
the jury: Did I act in a non-accidental way or with so little regard 
for the welfare of others as to deserve criminal penalties?  The 
practical effect of this mens rea requirement was that a juror had to 
pause to consider whether a defendant merited the full range of 
criminal penalties that the state could impose.  This is a procedural 
safeguard, any curtailment of which should be narrowly tailored in 
accordance with constitutional principles.  The legislature recog-
nized the need for this safeguard when it adopted the 1978 Revised 
Criminal Code.64  Alaska courts perceived the need to secure 
criminal defendants against an otherwise acceptable civil construc-
tion of a statute precisely because the punitive consequences of the 
criminal system tend to be so much more severe.  Prior to Hazel-
wood IV, courts had met this need by construing statutory ambigu-
ity against the government. 
IV.  VIOLENCE TO PRECEDENT: TURNING INTO THE WIND 
A. Speidel Rejects the Civil Standard of Negligence 
In Speidel v. State,65 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected out-
right the civil standard of negligence as the appropriate level of 
mens rea for criminal punishment.  There, the defendant was 
prosecuted and convicted for failing to return a rented motor vehi-
cle.66  The court dealt with the inherent ambiguity in the statute 
with a Rule of Lenity methodology, without actually using that 
term67—it categorized the State’s interpretation as “contrary to the 
 
generally Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of 
Cognate Civil and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 336–43 (1994). 
 63. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 877–78 (Alaska 1997). 
 64. See Stern, supra note 1, at 40.  The legislature carefully limited the role of 
criminal negligence in the penal system.  See id. (citing ALASKA SENATE J. SUPP. 
NO. 47, at 144 (June 12, 1978)) (“‘Criminal negligence’ will not apply unless the 
term is expressly included in the statute defining the offense.”). 
 65. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969). 
 66. Id. at 78. 
 67. See id. at 80–82. 
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general conditions of penal liability requiring not only the doing of 
some act by the person to be held liable, but also the existence of a 
guilty mind during the commission of the act.”68 
The statute in Speidel defined the requisite culpable mental 
state to mean that the defendant “willfully neglects,” or, in other 
words, the defendant “omits, fails, or forebears, with a conscious 
purpose to injure, or without regard for the rights of the owner, or 
with indifference whether a wrong is done the owner or not.”69  The 
court rejected a reading of the statute that allowed for conviction 
when the defendant merely acted “unwittingly or inadvertently or 
negligently.”70  In unambiguous terms, it declared those portions of 
the statute that supported such a construction to be “invalid and of 
no effect.”71  With its 1969 decision in Speidel, the Alaska Supreme 
Court put its imprimatur on the principle that for the state to con-
vict a defendant for a criminal offense “without proving criminal 
intent, is to deprive such person of due process of law.”72  What 
then caused the court to accept the civil standard for negligence in 
1997? 
The majority did not clearly distinguish Speidel in upholding 
Captain Hazelwood’s conviction.73  Chief Justice Compton’s dis-
sent, however, identified one possible distinction: he recognized 
that the conviction in Speidel involved a felony with more severe 
punishment than the misdemeanor for which Hazelwood was con-
victed.74  The majority opinion made no such felony-misdemeanor 
distinction.  But as the Chief Justice eloquently pointed out, 
“[s]uch a rule would be preferable to that which the court 
adopt[ed].”75  A rule of construction of this nature, one that limited 
civil negligence to misdemeanor offenses, would contain its own 
 
 68. Id. at 80. 
 69. Id. at 78 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026(a)–(b) (1968)). 
 70. Id. at 80. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The majority briefly recognized the contrary nature of Speidel, but justi-
fied the Hazelwood holding by comparison to strict liability offenses.  Hazelwood 
IV, 946 P.2d 875, 879–80 (“Further decisions reveal, however, that in some situa-
tions more will be required, and sometimes less.  Speidel found a denial of due 
process where the defendant had been convicted of . . . negligent failure to return 
a rented automobile. . . . On the other hand, elsewhere we have allowed the mens 
rea element to be dispensed with entirely.  We have allowed strict liability to be 
read into public welfare offenses.”). 
 74. Id. at 886–87 n.3 (Compton, C.J., dissenting) (“It could be argued that the 
greater the potential punishment, the greater must be the minimum mens rea for 
the crime.”). 
 75. Id. 
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limits and provide a meaningful marker for the lower courts.76  
Such a rule would be far more preferable than the one Hazelwood 
adopted because it would have a limit, unlike Hazelwood’s near 
evisceration of the prosecutorial burden for showing a culpable 
mental state. 
Nevertheless, the majority in Hazelwood did not attempt to 
limit the reach of its opinion in this manner, likely because of a 
problem that Chief Justice Compton highlighted: Captain Hazel-
wood’s ninety-day jail sentence stood in the path of a distinction 
premised on the severity of punishment.77  The Alaska Supreme 
Court has recognized the repercussions of a jail sentence since at 
least 1981.  In State v. Rice,78 Justice Matthews suggested that Due 
Process requires a “culpable mental state” in order to impose a 
prison sentence on a criminal defendant.79  He categorized a prison 
sentence as “an important, even traumatic, event in the life of a 
human being” regardless of its duration or the level of incarcera-
tion.80  “In my view due process requires that there be a culpable 
mental state in every case where a sentence of imprisonment may 
be imposed.”81  This dividing line between crimes for which jail sen-
tences may be imposed and other less-serious crimes exists in other 
areas of criminal law, including the right to trial by jury and the 
right to appointed counsel.82 
The considerable stigma associated with being imprisoned as 
well as the potential danger of incarceration suggest Captain 
Hazelwood was owed every measure of protection from wrongful 
conviction—including a requirement that the state establish that he 
possessed a mens rea deserving of criminal punishment.83  Thus, 
had the court adhered more closely to its own precedent, it would 
have overturned Captain Hazelwood’s conviction and required a 
showing of criminal negligence. 
 
 76. Indeed, there is some precedent for construing ambiguous misdemeanor 
statutes in this way.  See Langesater v. State, 668 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1983); Gudjonnson v. State, 667 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); Reynolds 
v. State, 655 P.2d 1313, 1315–17 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 77. Hazelwood I, 836 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (“Superior Court 
Judge Karl S. Johnstone sentenced Hazelwood to ninety days in jail.”). 
 78. 626 P.2d 104, 116 (Alaska 1981) (Matthews, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 116 n.1 (citing Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 915 
(Alaska 1971); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970)). 
 83. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 886–87 n.3 (Alaska 1997) (Compton, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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B. Guest’s and Rice’s Rejection of Strict Liability Are Not 
Equivalent to an Acceptance of Civil Negligence 
The Hazelwood majority invokes two cases that reject strict li-
ability in criminal prosecutions and require a showing of a culpable 
mental state: State v. Rice84 and State v. Guest.85  The opinion does 
not delve deeply into the substance of these cases; rather, it gives 
them one paragraph.86  That is not surprising.  Neither Guest nor 
Rice support using the civil standard of negligence as the default 
level of mens rea required for a criminal conviction. 
In Rice, the defendant was charged with the crime of “trans-
porting meat taken illegally.”87  Mr. Rice, a “big game guide,” flew 
his clients to a hunting area to hunt moose.88  Because they flew 
and hunted on the same day, the conduct was illegal.89  Although 
Mr. Rice’s clients were charged as co-defendants for the unlawful 
hunt, only Mr. Rice’s transporting offense presented a mens rea 
question. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska considered whether the admin-
istrative regulation under which Rice was charged required viola-
tive intent.90  The court was asked to reverse and uphold the jury 
instruction Rice’s counsel requested but did not receive: “[I]n or-
der to convict, the jury must be satisfied that the person either 
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the game or parts of 
game were illegally taken.”91 
The court characterized its inquiry as one of “whether a stat-
ute, which does not explicitly require criminal intent, implicitly re-
quires it.”92  The Rice court did not confuse the “reasonably should 
have known” standard, which fits within the bounds of a civil pro-
ceeding, with the distinct characteristics of actual criminal intent.93  
Rice did not equate the standard of ordinary negligence required in 
tort law with the mens rea required in criminal trials.  Indeed, Rice 
 
 84. 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981). 
 85. 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978). 
 86. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 879. 
 87. Rice, 626 P.2d at 106. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Specifically, they violated former section 81.070(b)(6) of the Alaska Ad-
ministrative Code.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 81.070(b)(6) (repealed 1981) (a 
“person who has been airborne may not thereafter take or assist in taking big 
game until after 3:00 a.m. following the day in which the flying occurred.”). 
 90. Rice, 626 P.2d at 106. 
 91. Id. at 107. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
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approvingly cited State v. Guest, the other case on which the 
Hazelwood court depended: 
We recognized in Speidel v. State, that consciousness of wrong-
doing is an essential element of penal liability.  It is said to be a 
universal rule that an injury can amount to a crime only when in-
flicted by intention that conduct cannot be criminal unless it is 
shown that one charged with criminal conduct had an awareness 
or consciousness of some wrongdoing.94 
Unlike the Hazelwood court, the Rice court drew a bright and clear 
distinction between civil injuries resulting from negligence and 
harms inflicted by criminal conduct.95 
The Rice court also recognized its obligation to adhere to the 
Rule of Lenity, though again without actually using that term: 
“Criminal statutes will be strictly construed to require some degree 
of mens rea absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary.”96  The 
supreme court assigned to lower courts an obligation “to determine 
whether mens rea must be made part of the definition of the par-
ticular offense.”97  Unlike Hazelwood, the Rice court acknowledged 
that, although exceptions might sometimes be made (in particular 
for strict liability offenses), those exceptions would not support ap-
plying the civil standard of negligence in criminal cases. 
In other words, the existence of some strict liability offenses 
does not equate to an across-the-board erosion of the mens rea re-
quirement in criminal cases.  The Rice court cautioned that strict 
liability must always remain “an exception to the rule which re-
quires criminal intent.”98  In contrast, the Hazelwood court devotes 
the bulk of its opinion to a discussion of strict liability offenses;99 its 
not-so-subtle suggestion is that if the mens rea requirement is 
flexible enough to accommodate strict liability, it must surely be 
able to accommodate a civil negligence standard.  But neither 
Speidel nor Rice tolerates the civil negligence standard in criminal 
cases.  To the contrary, the second case the Hazelwood court relied 
on, State v. Guest, reinforced the importance of the defendant’s 
right to force the state to establish criminal intent. 
In Guest, the Supreme Court of Alaska firmly rejected any 
inkling of a flexible mens rea requirement for non-general welfare 
 
 94. Id. (quoting State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 838 (Alaska 1978)). 
 95. The Rice court reaffirmed an earlier holding that mandated a case-by-case 
inquiry into the mens rea level required by a criminal statute.  See id. at 108 (citing  
Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. See Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 879–86 (Alaska 1997). 
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offenses in Alaska’s criminal justice system.100  Guest involved two 
defendants, Mr. Moses Guest and Mr. Jacob Evan, both of whom 
were charged with the statutory rape of T.D.G., a fifteen-year-old 
minor female.101  The defendants claimed “an honest and reason-
able mistake of fact regarding the victim’s age.”102  The supreme 
court reviewed a jury instruction recognizing a mistake-of-fact de-
fense.103  In essence, the issue was whether a mens rea requirement 
was to be read into the statutory rape law, or whether statutory 
rape imposed strict liability on a defendant.104 
Although most states had not allowed such a defense to statu-
tory rape, it was a case of first impression in Alaska.105  The court 
recognized in a footnote that such a defense, premised on the de-
fendants having acted knowingly, was not unprecedented.106  Other 
states allowed it by statute, including Arkansas, Montana, and 
Washington;107 California case law allowed the defense.108  More 
significantly, the drafters of the Alaska Criminal Code incorpo-
rated such a defense into the law, effective in 1980.109  But the court 
did not rely on the revised Code; instead it based its opinion on its 
own precedent. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Matthews declared that, “in 
such cases, where the particular statute is not a public welfare type 
of offense, either a requirement of criminal intent must be read into 
the statute or it must be found unconstitutional.”110  In particular, 
“it would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law to 
convict a person of a serious crime without the requirement of 
criminal intent.”111  Thus, the requirement of criminal intent for 
 
 100. See generally Benjamin L. Reiss, Alaska’s Mens Rea Requirements for 
Statutory Rape, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 377 (1992) (reviewing Guest and the mens rea 
required for conviction of statutory rape in Alaska). 
 101. State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 837 (Alaska 1978). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 837–38. 
 106. Id. at 838 n.2. 
 107. Id. (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1802(3) (1947); MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-
5-506(1) (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.160(2) (1976)). 
 108. People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964). 
 109. Guest, 583 P.2d at 838 n.2 (quoting ALASKA CRIM. CODE § 11.41.445(b) 
(1980) (if an offense requires that the victim be “under a certain age, it is an af-
firmative defense that, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant reasonably 
believed the victim to be that age or older, unless the victim was under 13 years of 
age at the time of the alleged offense”). 
 110. Id. at 839 (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 838. 
05__PERLA.DOC 6/5/2006  4:00 PM 
156 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:139 
criminal convictions took on constitutional status in Alaska.  The 
disputed jury instruction was proper.  The court held that the re-
quirement to show “criminal intent” necessarily permitted the de-
fendants’ affirmative defense of showing a mistake of fact.112 
Unlike in Hazelwood, the majority in Guest found ample au-
thority allowing a reasonable mistake of fact defense.113  That 
criminal intent must be read into a non-general welfare statute for 
it to be constitutional had even greater precedential support.114  The 
court again required adherence to the Rule of Lenity; it affirmed 
that, “[s]ince statutes should be construed where possible to avoid 
unconstitutionality, it is necessary to infer a requirement of crimi-
nal intent.”115  When faced with such clear and unambiguous lan-
guage in the court’s own jurisprudence, why the Hazelwood court 
would cite Guest as allowing any level of mens rea other than those 
inherent in Alaska’s criminal justice system is unclear.116 
 
 112. See id. at 839 n.5 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, 
CRIMINAL LAW, § 47, at 356–57 (1972) (“[T]he practice has developed of dealing 
with such mistakes as a matter of defense, perhaps because the facts showing their 
existence are usually brought out by the defendant.”).  Note how important this 
procedural safeguard becomes—a person may be civilly responsible for an acci-
dent even if he looked at the traffic light, believed it was green, but was mistaken.  
Whatever injustice might be created by punishing the defendant under these cir-
cumstances is mitigated by the fact that the civil defendant pays only damages.  He 
cannot receive a jail sentence for his error.  The law makes a distinction, however, 
when the defendant looks at the traffic light, believes it to be red but likely to 
change, and then drives through the intersection anyway.  Under those circum-
stances, the defendant may be punished by the criminal justice system as well as 
under the civil system. 
 113. Id. at 839 (citing Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 28–30 (Alaska 1978); 
Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 677 (Alaska 1971); Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 
(Alaska 1969)). 
 114. Id. (citing Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 30; Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 
296 (Alaska 1978); State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316, 321 (Alaska 1975); Hoffman v. 
State, 404 P.2d 644, 646 (Alaska 1965)). 
 115. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 116. It may well be that the Hazelwood court found that the civil negligence 
standard and the criminal negligence standard were too similar to merit extending 
the trial further.  Captain Hazelwood’s legal ship had been adrift for some time.  
Recall that the Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in March 1989 but Hazelwood 
was not decided by the court until October 1997.  However, this is speculation, 
and an express desire for closure is nowhere written into the Hazelwood opinion.  
But interestingly, in language that is remarkable for its understatement, the 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska characterized Captain 
Hazelwood’s legal trek as one involving “complexities.”  In re Exxon Valdez, 296 
F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (Alaska 2004).  The court observed that after Captain 
Hazelwood was prosecuted, his case “became involved in legal complexities which 
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The court of appeals considered one exception that would 
have held Captain Hazelwood accountable under a strict liability 
theory: it recognized that merchant ships and their crews work in a 
heavily regulated environment and their right to a showing of 
criminal mens rea might therefore be lessened.117  However, the 
court rejected this position because the statute was not limited to 
merchant ship drivers alone.118 
Perhaps an underlying belief in the merits of this exception 
tilted the Alaska Supreme Court towards the ordinary negligence 
standard:119 the court might have sought to limit the applicability of 
the statute’s criminal punishments as constitutional if the provision 
assigning jail terms was enforced only against participants in heav-
ily regulated industries.  Such a construction, while nonetheless 
flawed in other ways, would have been preferable to the wholesale 
abandonment of criminal intent in which the court engaged in-
stead. 
The Hazelwood court did not embrace an exception for heav-
ily regulated industries with any precision.  What is certain, how-
ever, is that an experienced and well-paid merchant ship captain 
like Captain Hazelwood would have found no safe harbor in the 
customs of his trade, because the unwritten laws of the sea place 
high expectations on ship captains. 
C. Law of the Sea: Responsibility, Authority, and Accountability 
It is sometimes difficult for those who have not spent time at 
sea to understand the “law of the sea.”  Indeed, the number and 
complexity of tasks that a reasonably prudent ship captain is ex-
pected to handle might seem overly harsh in comparison to other 
professions.  In an editorial commenting on the 1952 nighttime col-
lision between the aircraft carrier Wasp and the destroyer Hobson, 
the Wall Street Journal explained the ship captain’s duties of care 
as rooted in history and tradition: 
On the sea there is a tradition older even than the traditions of 
the country itself and wiser in its age than this new custom.  It is 
the tradition that with responsibility goes authority and with 
them both goes accountability. . . . [M]en will not long trust lead-
 
led to multiple appeals.  Some nine years after the grounding, a single misdemeanor 
conviction, for negligent discharge of oil was affirmed on appeal.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 117. See Hazelwood III, 912 P.2d 1266, 1279 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 883 (“Persons operating in rule-laden envi-
ronments, and whose actions have a substantial impact on public health, safety, or 
welfare, can reasonably be assumed aware of their governing codes.”). 
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ers who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do.  
And when men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, or-
der disintegrates into chaos and purposeful ships into uncontrol-
lable derelicts.120 
A Navy inquiry placed the blame for the accident squarely 
with the captain of the Hobson, Lieutenant Commander Tierney.121  
It did so even though Captain Tierney had no visual references to 
steer by (the Wasp was running dark, meaning its running lights 
were out for wartime steaming).  Testimony indicated that Captain 
Tierney failed to fully understand the implications of a radio warn-
ing Wasp issued informing him that Wasp had turned into the wind 
to launch and recover her aircraft.122  Once the navigation hazard, 
the unplanned proximity to the aircraft carrier, became apparent, 
Captain Tierney reportedly made several ill-fated rudder orders 
that took Hobson dangerously close and then directly in front of 
Wasp.123  The ensuing collision destroyed a ninety-foot section of 
Wasp’s bow and split Hobson’s hull wide open.  In just minutes, she 
dropped into the sea, taking with her 176 of the 237 souls onboard, 
including her captain.124 
According to the Admirals who comprised the incident review 
board, Captain Tierney committed a “grave error of judgment” by 
issuing the final rudder orders that were the “sole cause” of the col-
lision.125  This assignment of blame might appear harsh if the in-
quiry were limited to the single, perhaps negligent, rudder order 
that led to Hobson’s crossing Wasp’s bow.  However, whether he 
had given the order or not, Captain Tierney would have been held 
accountable under the law of the sea for what happened on the 
ship.  In a manner of speaking, this story illustrates a kind of strict 
liability for the heavily regulated industry that is the U.S. Navy.126  
 
 120. Hobson’s Choice, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1952, at 10. 
 121. Riddle of the Hobson, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 25, 1952, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/ 0,10987,816769,00.html. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See The USS Wasp vs. The USS Hobson Incident, 
http://www.cv18.com/hist/hobson.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
 125. Riddle of the Hobson, TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 25, 1952,  available at 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0, 10987,816769,00.html. 
 126. See Chief Naval Education and Training Commanding Officer Course, 
Assignment 1, available at http://wwwnt.cnet.navy.mil/cls/CO%20assignment_ 
2.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
The determination of criminal responsibility is therefore properly the 
province of our system of military justice.  The acquittal of a command-
ing officer by a duly constituted court-martial absolves him of criminal 
responsibility for the offenses charged.  It does not, however, absolve 
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Merchant vessels are also beholden to these unwritten laws of the 
sea. 
Taken in this context, it is easy to understand the instinctual 
response to hold the captain of the ship responsible for one of the 
worst environmental tragedies in history.  The evidence of Captain 
Hazelwood’s culpability was considerable and likely played a part 
in the trial court’s acceptance of the disputed jury instruction.127  
The crew’s actions and the conduct of the ship’s operations were a 
direct reflection of Captain Hazelwood’s leadership.  Even if he did 
not drive the ship into Bligh Reef, Captain Hazelwood laid the 
framework for the conditions that led to that event.  I do not intend 
this Note to suggest that Captain Hazelwood may not have been 
criminally negligent for the events leading up to and during that 
fateful night.  Even under the more stringent standard of criminal 
negligence, I believe the jury would have convicted him. 
Despite the likelihood of Captain Hazelwood’s conviction un-
der the criminal standard of negligence, the court’s decision to let 
stand this conviction and jail term based on the civil standard car-
ries with it serious negative consequences for due process.  It is 
tempting to resort to a balancing here, admitting the error of the 
standard used but justifying it nonetheless because of the scale of 
the tragedy.  Enforcing individual rights often involves balancing.  
Indeed, “[d]ue process under Alaska’s Constitution requires that 
social interests be weighed against those of the individual.”128  Over 
the long term, however, the interests of society and those of the in-
dividual are one and the same.  The conventions with which we 
hold each other accountable have some flexibility, but our rules 
cannot be so ephemeral so as to disappear when a defendant is par-
ticularly unpopular.  Standards in the criminal system have mean-
ing only if we adhere to them, and that is especially true in the case 
of unlikable defendants. 
 
him of his responsibility as a commanding officer as delineated in U.S. 
Navy Regulations. 
Id. 
 127. See Enge, supra note 31, at A1 (quoting Superior Court Judge Karl Johns-
tone as saying “[n]o reasonably prudent person operating a tanker like the Exxon 
Valdez would have had those drinks before getting on board [or] would have left 
the bridge when Captain Hazelwood did . . . [a]nd I believe Captain Hazelwood 
knows the buck stops with him.”). 
 128. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 883 (Alaska 1997). 
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V.  UN-DUE PROCESS: AN AFFRONT TO LIBERTY 
A. Alaska’s Exceptions to the Mens Rea Requirement Were Lim-
ited 
Prior to Hazelwood, Alaska’s requirement for an adequate 
showing of mens rea in criminal cases had exceptions, but these 
were limited largely to strict liability offenses.  The Hazelwood ma-
jority discussed Alaska’s “strict liability tradition” at some length.129  
It included in its opinion a summary of the development of excep-
tions to the requirement “that conduct cannot be criminal unless it 
is shown that one . . . had an awareness or consciousness of some 
wrongdoing.”130  While it acknowledged the requirement for mens 
rea in criminal offenses, the majority then subordinated the mens 
rea requirement, relying on the “parallel tradition [that] has al-
lowed imposition of penalties without formal proof of criminal in-
tent.”131 
Undeniably, the Hazelwood majority found a lengthy history 
and tradition in support of strict liability, including an interesting 
look at the ancient law of “deodands.”132  Although these cases es-
tablished a history in support of strict liability in criminal law gen-
erally, none allowed for the criminal prosecution and incarceration 
of an accused without first showing that he possessed an appropri-
ate level of mens rea.133  Indeed, the court indicated one year earlier 
that doing so would violate the Alaska Constitution.134 
After weighing the various merits of the deodands, in rem pro-
ceedings, and several competing academic papers, the Hazelwood 
court found itself coming face to face with a requirement even 
more compelling: it realized that it had to limit the bounds of its 
holding to conform with the due process clause of Alaska’s consti-
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 880. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 882 (citing Hertzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980) (dis-
cussing the technical elements of proof and recognizing that for “mala in se” of-
fenses such as murder and rape, proof of the conscious act is an adequate showing 
of mens rea)). 
 134. State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996). 
It would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law to convict 
a person of a serious crime without the requirement of criminal in-
tent. . . . [W]e adhere to the principles articulated in Speidel, Alex, Ki-
moktoak, and Guest that, except for public welfare type of offenses, strict 
criminal liability without some form of mens rea is violative of Alaska’s 
Constitution. 
Id. 
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tution.  “While society’s interest in obtaining compliance with its 
regulations is strong, it can never outweigh the individual’s interest 
in freedom from substantial punishment for a violation he or she 
could not reasonably have been expected to avoid.”135  Ordinary 
negligence merits criminal punishment, the court suggested, be-
cause it can be avoided.136  This portion of the opinion is particu-
larly dangerous, inasmuch as it directly threatens individual liberty 
and due process. 
This language dramatically changed Alaska’s mens rea re-
quirements.  It lets the State move from having to show the defen-
dant possessed criminal intent—a desire to do wrong—to merely 
showing he “could reasonably have been expected” not to break a 
law or regulation.  The Hazelwood court reasoned that the civil 
standard for negligence was acceptable because it roughly “ap-
proximates what the due process guarantee aims at: an assurance 
that criminal penalties will be imposed only when the conduct at 
issue is something society can reasonably expect to deter.”137  The 
swath thus cut is staggering. 
Under the “reasonably expect to deter” standard, it is very 
hard to imagine a conviction that would require more than mere 
negligence.  Consider the hypothetical that the court quoted with 
approval in Guest, that of the man who mistakenly takes a woman’s 
umbrella from a restaurant because he believes it is his.138 
 
 135. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 883. 
 136. An alternative theory is that even if ordinary negligence does not merit 
punishment in its own right, society is nonetheless justified in imposing criminal 
penalties on the negligent actor because doing so serves to deter other actors from 
being negligent in the future.  See Leslie Garfield, A More Principled Approach to 
Criminalizing Negligence: A Prescription for the Legislature, 65 TENN. L. REV. 875, 
924 (1998).  The problem with this approach is that it seeks to get around the pro-
tections inherent in the civil system at the peril of the criminal defendant.  Civil 
plaintiffs, including the government, may not receive exemplary damages absent 
some culpable mental state beyond mere ordinary negligence.  It makes little 
sense and does no small measure of violence to precedent to allow the govern-
ment to make an example out of a merely negligent defendant just by switching 
from the civil docket to the criminal one.  Indeed, it is particularly heinous in light 
of the liberty interests that are necessarily put at risk in criminal cases.  Courts 
should be wary of making this leap even with the express authorization of their 
respective legislatures. 
 137. Id. 
 138. State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 n.5 (Alaska 1978) (quoting LAFAVE & 
SCOTT, supra note 112, at 356–57).  I expand the example by assigning genders to 
distinguish between the potential defendant and the victim of this most heinous 
umbrella thievery. 
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Society can reasonably expect to deter the taking of another’s 
property, so this hapless restaurant patron is now in a pretty pickle 
indeed.  He has inadvertently invited the full wrath of the criminal 
justice system upon himself because he “unreasonably” failed to 
verify that the umbrella in his hand was the one he left by the door. 
In the same way, consider how very different Speidel, Rice, 
and Guest would have turned out had they been adjudicated be-
neath an inquisitor checked only by what society might reasonably 
expect to deter.  Mr. Speidel failed to return a rental car, Mr. Rice 
transported illegally obtained meat, and the Guest defendants 
failed to ascertain the true age of their willing, but minor, partner.  
Before Hazelwood, these defendants were not criminals.  But after 
Hazelwood, they may be criminally liable.  The state must show 
only that their acts were something society could reasonably expect 
to deter.  Indeed, the limitlessness of the “reasonably expect to de-
ter” standard is overwhelming.  Since it can hardly be expected that 
the legislature would enact a law proscribing conduct that society 
cannot reasonably be expected to deter, no level of mens rea be-
yond mere negligence need be read into a statute.  Thus, the rea-
sonably expect to deter standard reaches our entire criminal code.  
Under the guise of proscribing conduct society could reasonably 
expect to deter, the Hazelwood court all but eviscerated the ele-
ment of mens rea in Alaska. 
In light of the Hazelwood court’s expansive reformation of 
criminal intent in Alaska, one might have expected the court to 
remark on how its new standard would impact its prior jurispru-
dence, but it did not.  The closest it came was a string cite in a foot-
note to a series of cases from other jurisdictions that “allow crimes 
based on ordinary negligence,” at least some of which rested on 
legislative grounds.139  The cases cited are not persuasive inasmuch 
as they ignore Alaska’s prior jurisprudence and legislative history.  
The legislature that modeled the 1978 Revised Criminal Code after 
the Model Penal Code certainly felt that a higher standard was 
needed.140  Professor LaFave and others have noted that a “general 
feeling” has surfaced among judges, some of whom preside in those 
other jurisdictions, that civil negligence is close enough to ensure 
the correct transfer of money for damages suffered but does not 
 
 139. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 884 n.17. 
 140. See Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 1063, 1066 n.5 (Alaska App. 1982) (quoting 
COMMENTARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, S.J. SUPP. NO. 47, at 
142–43 (1978)). 
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have the accuracy to ensure that neither life nor liberty are de-
prived without due process.141 
In an attempt to unfurl and fill one last sail, the Hazelwood 
court attacked the “[p]artisans” that fear the substitution of civil 
negligence for mens rea.  It criticized these partisans for their insis-
tence on using an overly technical but relatively imprecise standard 
of criminal negligence.142  The court engaged in a bit of hyperbole 
here.  As Chief Justice Compton correctly pointed out in his dis-
sent, it was inaccurate to say “the only consensus and precision 
available in the definition of criminal negligence is that it is not 
civil negligence.”143  The statutory definition of criminal negli-
gence144 distinguishes ordinary negligence by requiring a gross de-
viation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
have observed under like circumstances.145  Likewise, Alaska has a 
Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction that defines criminal negligence 
in no uncertain terms: “something more than the slight degree of 
negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages and is 
negligence of a degree so gross as to be deserving of punishment.”146  
It is precisely this emphasis on punishment that a criminal defen-
dant had been entitled to under Alaska’s prior jurisprudence. 
The distinction between what is mere negligence and what is 
gross negligence is unambiguous even in the oft-murky arena of 
tort.  One standard allows for the injured plaintiff to receive puni-
tive damages at trial and the other does not.  For the Hazelwood 
court to seriously contend that the partisan’s “fear of torts is un-
founded,” it would have had to read Alaska’s jury instruction for 
gross negligence as superfluous.  The court, while doing no small 
measure of violence to its own precedent, did not go so far as to 
rewrite Alaska’s jury instructions. 
Instead, the court noted that similar language was used in both 
criminal and civil proceedings.  Referring to a 1930 Michigan Su-
preme Court case,147 the court noted that either the wrongful taking 
of property or of liberty violated due process.  The court wrongly 
assumed that due process had the same meaning in the criminal 
 
 141. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 889 (Compton, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 326 
(1986)). 
 142. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 885. 
 143. Id. 
 144. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(4) (2004). 
 145. Hazelwood III, 912 P.2d 1266, 1278 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
 146. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 889 (Compton, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 147. People v. McMurchy, 228 N.W. 723 (Mich. 1930). 
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and civil arenas.  It rationalized that, first, since “the same constitu-
tional clause which governs the criminal prosecution would also 
govern a civil proceeding, and [second,] because it is undisputed 
that due process is satisfied by the negligence standard” in civil 
matters, it must be that due process in criminal cases can also be 
satisfied by the same negligence standard.148 
This argument is deeply troubling.  It is as if the court accepted 
the use of ordinary negligence in criminal trials because it allowed 
that standard to govern in civil ones.  That argument cannot be 
widely applied.  We relax a host of protections for civil matters 
when we would not do so in a criminal court.  For example, we al-
low civil juries to reach a decision with a mere preponderance of 
the evidence standard.  Civil defendants have no right against self-
incrimination, have less privacy to resist searches, and operate un-
der an entirely different discovery regime.149  The burden of proof 
in criminal matters, in contrast, is far more rigidly defined as a 
function of due process.150  Even in Hazelwood, the supreme court 
recognized the difference between civil and criminal proceedings. 
The court reaffirmed the principle that some sanctions that 
“normally would run afoul of due process” might nonetheless be 
“allowed because the penalties are light.”151  By its own admission 
then, we cannot look to the civil notions of due process to govern 
our criminal system without compromising the latter.  Our expecta-
tion of what constitutes due process in the civil forum is lower than 
in the criminal forum precisely because civil penalties are “light” in 
comparison to criminal punishments. 
 
 148. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 885. 
 149. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself”) (emphasis added); United States v. Hubbell, 
530 U.S. 27 (2000); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Compare Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 32 with Fed. R. Crimp. P. 16. 
 150. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979) (reversing the 
conviction since “[the] jury may have interpreted the judge’s instruction as consti-
tuting either a burden-shifting presumption like that in Mullaney, or a conclusive 
presumption like those in Morissette and United States Gypsum Co., and because 
either interpretation would have deprived defendant of his right to the due proc-
ess of law”); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (reversing a criminal 
conviction on due process grounds when the defendant’s request that the jury be 
reminded of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused was rejected). 
 151. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 884. 
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B. Civil Standards are Inadequate for Assigning Criminal Pun-
ishments 
Civil negligence, while blameworthy, is not the same as crimi-
nal negligence.  The civil standard of negligence has no proper 
place within the elements of a criminal offense.  The civil standard 
of negligence is not robust enough to guarantee that accidental and 
benign offenders are not criminally punished.152  It is no trivial mat-
ter that the legislature “requires negligence of a degree so gross as 
to be deserving of punishment” in its jury instructions.  Irrespective 
of what society may reasonably expect to deter, the jury instruc-
tions provide “a persuasive argument that societal notions of fun-
damental fairness do not permit imprisonment for the simple ne-
glectfulness embodied in the civil negligence standard.  Such 
notions, in turn, shape the right of due process.”153 
Criminal punishments, and incarceration in particular, are in-
tended to punish.  Defendants are not sent to jail to “make whole” 
the victim for their crimes inasmuch as they are put there to atone 
for their criminal conduct.  The same principles underlie punitive 
damages in tort.154  Just two years prior to Hazelwood, the supreme 
court “established that ‘mere negligence is insufficient to justify an 
award of punitive damages.’”155  It therefore makes little sense that 
the civil standard of negligence could be sufficient for a jury to im-
pose a prison sentence when that same showing would be insuffi-
cient for a jury to award punitive damages.  Nonetheless, the 
Hazelwood court upheld Captain Hazelwood’s conviction and 
prison sentence under the mere negligence standard, even though 
it would not have allowed punitive damages for the same conduct.  
Hopefully this is little more than an aberration. 
There have been few subsequent cases that directly cite the 
Hazelwood decision.  In Latham v. State,156 the Alaska Court of 
Appeals noted in a memorandum opinion that the state justified its 
 
 152. Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 1063, 1066 n.5 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (quoting 
COMMENTARY ON THE ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE, S.J. SUPP. NO. 47, at 
142–43 (1978)). 
 153. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d at 889 (Compton, C.J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (“Punitive 
damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and 
the like, which constitute ordinary negligence (but are restricted to) conduct in-
volving some element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime.”)). 
 155. Id. (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Alaska Inc. v. Blomfield, 907 P.2d 1371, 
1376 (Alaska 1995) (allowing punitive damages only for “acts done with malice or 
bad motives or a reckless indifference to the interests of others”). 
 156. No. A-7198, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 111, *16–19 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 
2000) (mem.). 
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jury instruction at trial partly on the Hazelwood decision.157  The 
court, however, did not discuss the state’s argument and decided 
the issue on other grounds.158  In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Mannheimer briefly acknowledged the uncertainty of the mental 
state required by the statute without further discussing the Hazel-
wood decisions.159  In State v. Simpson, the court of appeals cited to 
Hazelwood as the most recent affirmation of a very limited propo-
sition not directly relating to the use of the civil negligence stan-
dard in criminal convictions.160 
Lastly, in Schmidt v. State,161 the Alaska Court of Appeals in 
another memorandum opinion cited to Hazelwood to justify the 
imposition of large fines on the basis of the deterrent effect those 
fines necessarily have.162  The opinion did make one casual refer-
ence that seemed to acknowledge the arguments made here and in 
the dissent in Hazelwood.  The defendant argued that the fines he 
received were excessive in light of the smaller fines imposed on an 
even more egregious offender in a separate case.163  The court justi-
fied the defendant’s seemingly disparate treatment by pointing out 
the more egregious offender’s smaller fine was accompanied by a 
lengthy jail sentence.164  Thus, fortunately, the harm inflicted by 
Captain Hazelwood on Alaska’s mens rea jurisprudence appears to 
have been contained. 
Captain Hazelwood’s conviction may have served the short-
term interests of the people of Alaska to have ended this matter 
without a second trial.  But the long-term health of the judiciary in 
Alaska depends on the consistent application of the legislature’s 
laws and the court’s precedents.  Popular approval can be a fickle 
thing, difficult to attract and easy to lose.  Expedient departures 
from precedent, while seemingly appealing in light of the individual 
circumstances of a particular case, nevertheless should be avoided.  
Such departures run the risk of exposing the court to uninvited 
peril.  Future courts, operating in similar seas, are well advised to 
steer clear of such hazards. 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Latham, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS at *18–20 (Mannheimer, J., concur-
ring). 
 160. 53 P.3d 165, 167 n.5 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 161. No. A-8669, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 35, *21–22 n.23 (Apr. 6, 2005) 
(mem.). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *25–26. 
 164. Id. 
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VI.  SUGGESTED COURSE: STEER CLEAR OF THE STORM 
A. Criminal Negligence for Ship Captains 
The law uses industry standards to help establish what a rea-
sonable person would do in like circumstances.  Ship captains, as 
with other professionals, set the standard of care within the indus-
try collectively.  These standards depend to some degree on the 
civil system.  But civil negligence alone hardly justifies criminal 
punishment. 
Consider the medical community, which is made up of profes-
sionals who routinely act under pressures that are analogous to, if 
not greater than, those of ship captains.  Physicians are under an 
affirmative duty to use the degree of care and skill that is expected 
of a reasonably competent practitioner of the same class to which 
he or she belongs, and acting under the same circumstances.165  A 
physician’s mere negligence will not ordinarily expose that physi-
cian to criminal punishment unless his or her want of care, relative 
to other doctors, is so extreme that it can be categorized as crimi-
nal.166  If the standard were otherwise, then every successful mal-
practice lawsuit would be the precursor for criminal sanctions.  
That is, of course, not the case.  Criminal prosecutions of medical 
professionals are rare even in cases that warrant punitive damages.  
Comparing a criminal defendant’s conduct to the industry stan-
dard, however, provides a bright and clear navigation aid to deter-
mine whether ship captains who are negligent merit criminal pun-
ishment. 
Indeed, Alaska Statute section 11.81.900 defines criminal neg-
ligence by referring to the “standard of care.”167  A ship captain 
would be criminally negligent only if he “fails to perceive a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk” and if “the risk [is] of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross devia-
tion from the standard of care that a reasonable person would ob-
serve in the situation.”168  The burden for taking the industry stan-
dard precautions—remaining sober, using the barest minimum of 
navigation aids, and ensuring that only qualified personnel pilot the 
 
 165. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (2004). 
 166. See George J. Annas, Medicine, Death and the Criminal Law, 333 NEW 
ENG. J. MED.  527, 527–30 (1995), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/ 
content/full/333/8/527?ijkey=2a3d49850c425014edf712b2be3303a765710b30&keyt
ype2=tf_ipsecsha. 
 167. ALASKA STAT § 11.81.900(4) (2004). 
 168. See id. 
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ship in and around shallow waters—is minimal.169  The task of mer-
chants and sailors alike is to move their ship from one place to an-
other.  They are expected to do so safely.  This level of care is espe-
cially important when costs associated with not doing so can be 
disastrous to crew, cargo, and as in this case, to the coastline. 
It is of little import what an average individual, albeit a rea-
sonable one, would have done had he been thrust onto the bridge 
of the Exxon Valdez.  The hypothetical reasonable person does not 
face criminal punishment.170  For precisely this reason, Alaska’s 
courts have required the state to show that the defendant on trial 
possessed criminal intent, i.e., that he acted with “something more 
than mere ‘neglectfulness.’”171  This intent is crucial.  People have 
accidents even when they exercise care; not every accident merits 
criminal sanctions.  The defendant’s conduct must constitute a 
gross deviation from the standard of care, and just as a physician’s 
want of care is measured relative to other doctors, the conduct of a 
merchant captain can fairly be measured against that of a reason-
able captain subject to the rules that govern the transport of toxic 
materials in environmentally sensitive waters. 
Industry standards would have likely demonstrated that Cap-
tain Hazelwood acted with something more than neglectfulness. 
Hazelwood’s errors were more than foreseeable and he knew the 
risks he was creating by drinking on the job.  Captains know the ex-
tent of risk they face and accept responsibility for the safe conduct 
of their vessel.  Given the hazards involved, safe navigation precau-
tions were more than feasible.  Navigation in open and restricted 
waters exists precisely because navigation in and around narrow 
channels is extremely dangerous.172  Hazelwood surely knew of this 
danger. 
As such, Captain Hazelwood would almost certainly have 
been convicted under Alaska’s criminal standard of negligence.  
The court could have preserved its precedent without fear of let-
ting Captain Hazelwood go unpunished.  The problem with sus-
taining his conviction under the civil standard of negligence, how-
ever, is that doing so removed an important procedural right.  
Future criminal defendants can no longer look at their peers and 
ask whether their inadvertence was so egregious as to merit crimi-
nal punishment.  This change is deceptively minimal in the instant 
 
 169. See U.S. COAST GUARD, NAVIGATION RULES 6–17 (2005). 
 170. Stern, supra note 1 at 18 (quoting Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 32 
(Alaska 1978). 
 171. Hazelwood IV, 946 P.2d 875, 887 (Alaska 1997) (Compton, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
 172. See 46 C.F.R. § 15.812 (2006). 
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case.  How it might impact the outcome of a closer case, i.e., one 
involving the prior example of umbrella thievery, is impossible to 
know.  It is hard to predict what future juries will do. 
B. The Legislature’s Response 
The statute under which Captain Hazelwood was convicted 
was amended in 1990 to set the unlawful discharge “barrel” limits 
for either a class C felony or a class A misdemeanor.173  The legisla-
tion was enacted during an intense period of legislative reform im-
mediately following the spill and in a run-up to the 1990 elections.174  
As part of this revision, the statute expressly set out that criminal 
penalties for an oil discharge attach only if the accused acts with 
criminal negligence.175  The legislature, acting immediately after 
Captain Hazelwood’s trial, reacted to the widespread public per-
ception that existing laws were an inadequate deterrent and rela-
tively ineffective.  It expressly linked the applicable criminal negli-
gence standard for oil discharges to Alaska’s other criminal code 
provisions.176  Reiterating the intent it evidenced in 1978 when it re-
vised the Criminal Code, the legislature again returned to the struc-
ture of the Model Penal Code.177  The legislature showed fidelity to 
criminal negligence rather than a mere civil negligence standard. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Supreme Court lessened the level of protection af-
forded criminal defendants by affirming the criminal conviction of 
the captain of the Exxon Valdez without a showing of criminal neg-
ligence.  Although Captain Hazelwood might nonetheless have 
been convicted under the criminal negligence standard, the court 
did no small measure of violence to precedent with its holding.  It 
ignored both stare decisis and traditional norms of statutory con-
struction.  It found the evidence adduced at trial sufficient for im-
 
 173. See Hazelwood III, 912 P.2d 1266, 1278 n.14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).  The 
statute provides that “an unlawful discharge of 10,000 barrels or more of oil” con-
stitutes a class C felony and “a lesser discharge amounts to a class A misde-
meanor.”  Id. (citing 1990 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 141, §§ 2–5). 
 174. David Postman, Fast Track No Longer Greased for New Oil Regulations, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 1990, at A1. 
 175. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.790 (a), (d), & (g)(2) (2004) (declaring that “a per-
son who with criminal negligence discharges oil in violation of” the statute is sub-
ject to criminal punishment). 
 176. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900 (2004). 
 177. See Stern, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
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prisoning the defendant even though that same evidence would not 
support awarding punitive damages. 
While the court had discretion to interpret an ambiguous stat-
ute, the legislature also remained free to act.  It wasted little time in 
doing so, amending the statute explicitly to require criminal intent.  
That it restored the mens rea requirement demonstrated no small 
measure of legislative intent.  The statute serves as a reminder to 
the court that “it would be a deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law to convict a person of a serious crime without the 
requirement of criminal intent”178 and to “adhere to the principles 
articulated in Speidel, Alex, Kimoktoak, and Guest that, except for 
public welfare type of offenses, strict criminal liability without 
some form of mens rea “equates to a violation of due process un-
der Alaska’s Constitution.”179 
 
 178. State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996). 
 179. Id. at 1246. 
